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Abstract 
Three experiments examined children’s ability to feel regret following a failure to act 
prosocially. In Experiment 1, 90 6-to 7-year-olds and 107 7-to 9-year-olds were given a 
choice to donate a resource to another child. If they failed to donate, they discovered that this 
meant the other child could not win a prize. Children in both age groups then showed 
evidence of experiencing regret, although not in control conditions where they had not made 
the choice themselves or their choice did not negatively affect the other child. In Experiment 
2, 85 5-to 6-year-olds and 109 7-to 9-year-olds completed the same task; only the older group 
showed evidence of regret. In Experiment 3, with 134 6-to 7-year-olds, experiencing regret 
was associated with subsequently making other prosocial choices.  
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There has been a surge of research on the development of regret in children over the 
last five years (Burns, Riggs & Beck, 2012; O'Connor, McCormack & Feeney, 2012, 2014; 
O'Connor, McCormack, Beck & Feeney, 2015; Rafetseder & Perner, 2012; Van 
Duijvenvoorde, Huizenga, & Jansen, 2014; Weisberg & Beck, 2010, 2012). All of this 
research, and indeed most research on regret in adults, has focused on regret in the context of 
self-interested choice. However, regret may also occur in the context of decisions that have a 
negative impact on another person rather than on oneself (Berndsen, van der Pligt, Doosjie, & 
Manstead, 2004; Zeelenberg & Breugelmans, 2008). In this study, we were particularly 
interested in regret that occurs after a failure to act prosocially. Our aim was to examine the 
development of regret in the context of prosocial choice, and to determine if this type of 
regret develops at a similar age to regret concerning self-interested choices. We also 
examined whether experiencing this type of regret had an impact on children’s tendency to 
behave prosocially.  
What is regret? 
Regret is usually defined as a counterfactual emotion that manifests as a negative 
feeling when, having made a decision, one finds out that the resulting outcome is not as good 
as it could have been (Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2005; Zeelenberg, 1999). We will adopt the 
terminology used by Berndsen et al. (2004) in distinguishing between intrapersonal and 
interpersonal regret, with the former resulting when outcomes are non-optimal for the self, 
and the latter when outcomes are harmful or non-optimal for another person. Both 
intrapersonal and interpersonal regret require the ability to think of an alternative world in 
which the events that caused them did not occur. In other words, they require a level of 
counterfactual thinking ability because they involve entertaining a possible world in which a 
better outcome would have obtained had a different choice between made (Roese, 1994; 
Roese & Olsen, 1995).  Because of this requirement, counterfactual thinking abilities must 
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have developed in order for children to be able to experience such emotions.  However, there 
is considerable debate over when counterfactual thinking skills first emerge (e.g., Beck, 
Robinson, Carroll, & Apperly, 2006; Harris, German, & Mills, 1996; Rafetseder, Schwitalla, 
& Perner, 2012). Given this, it is not surprising that there is also some disagreement over 
when children can first experience regret. 
Although there is disagreement over when children can first experience regret, there is 
broad agreement that this is a relatively late developing emotion because of its reliance on 
counterfactual cognition. This is particularly important when considering the question of 
when interpersonal regret can first be observed, because it has been suggested that even very 
young children show some behavioral and physiological evidence of negative emotions 
following a transgression (Ioannou et al., 2013; Kochanska, Gross, Lin & Nichols, 2002). 
Developmentalists studying such emotions in young children typically described themselves 
as measuring guilt rather than regret. Guilt has indeed been sometimes assumed to be closely 
associated with counterfactual thought (e.g., Mandel, 2003; Niedenthal, Tangey, & Gavanski, 
1994), and some researchers do not seem to differentiate between guilt and what we have 
termed interpersonal regret (Berndsen et al., 2010; Malti et al. 2016; though see Proeve & 
Tudor, 2010; Zeelenberg & Breugelmans, 2008). However, although there is good evidence 
that counterfactual thinking may indeed magnify feelings of guilt (Mandel & Dhami, 2005; 
Miller & Turnbull, 1990), we do not believe that in its simplest form guilt necessarily 
requires counterfactual thought. That is, we are assuming that negative feelings of guilt can 
result from considering the harm that one has done in the actual world without necessarily 
requiring in addition entertaining the counterfactual thought that the harm could have been 
avoided if one had chosen differently. This leaves open the possibility that young children 
who have difficulties thinking counterfactually may potentially be able to experience guilt, 
with interpersonal regret being a later-developing emotion.  
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The Development of Regret 
Typically, when measuring regret in children, a simple task is used in which children 
make a forced choice between two options in order to gain a reward; in most developmental 
studies, children choose between two boxes that contain small prizes.  Children initially see 
what prize their chosen box contains and then rate their emotion on a self-report scale 
(usually depicting faces ranging from very sad to very happy).  In circumstances in which 
regret is being measured, children are then shown that if they had chosen the other box they 
would have obtained a better prize and are typically asked to rate their feelings again.  
Children who report feeling sadder on seeing that they could have won a better prize had they 
chosen differently are classified as experiencing regret. This form of forced choice task has 
been used in the majority of studies on the development of regret in children (Burns et al., 
2012; O'Connor et al., 2012, 2014; O'Connor, McCormack, Beck & Feeney, 2015; Rafetseder 
& Perner, 2012; Van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2014; Weisberg & Beck, 2010; 2012).  Although 
studies differ from each other in procedural details, the majority of these studies suggest that 
children experience regret from around 6 years, although some researchers place this 
development a year earlier (Weisberg & Beck, 2012).  
The notable exception to this pattern is the study of Rafetseder and Perner (2012); 
these researchers argue that it is not until children are around 9 years that regret is first in 
evidence. Rafetseder and Perner’s (2012) reluctance to conclude that younger children can 
experience regret stems in part from their concern that children’s negative feelings on 
discovering that they could have won a better prize may not be best described as regret. 
Specifically, they suggest that this negative emotion may be better described as frustration 
about not having the best prize (which does not necessarily require thinking counterfactually) 
rather than regret over not having chosen differently. Weisberg and Beck (2012) also 
considered this possible interpretation of children’s emotions and examined it by 
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manipulating children’s responsibility for the outcome. They compared three conditions: 
either children chose between two boxes to win a prize, children threw a die to determine 
which box they received, or the experimenter threw a die. They found that children were only 
likely to report feeling sadder on seeing what prize they could have obtained in the first of 
these conditions, and argued that this suggested that these feelings of sadness reflected regret 
regarding the choice for which they had responsibility (see also O’Connor et al., 2015). They 
reasoned that if children’s emotions simply reflect frustration at not having the best outcome, 
they should feel sad in all three conditions.  
The Development of Guilt  
We are not aware of any developmental studies that have directly examined 
interpersonal regret per se. However, there is a considerable body of research on the 
development of guilt (e.g., Barrett, Zahn-Waxler, & Cole, 1993; Bybee, 1998; Ferguson, 
Stegge, Miller, & Olsen, 1999; Malti, 2016; Malti & Dys, 2015; Tangney, Wagner, Hill-
Barlow, Marschall, & Gramzow, 1996). Behavioral studies of guilt in younger children have 
typically used a mishap paradigm, in which young children cause accidental damage to an 
object and their behavioral and affective responses to the situation are measured. These 
studies find that many toddlers show a response pattern that has been interpreted as guilt, 
such as reparative behavior combined with evidence of distress or discomfort in their 
facial/vocal expressions and bodily posture (Barrett et al., 1993; Kochanska et al., 2002). 
Children’s physiological responses in the mishap paradigm are consistent with this 
interpretation of their behavior (Baker, Baibazarova, Ktistaki, Shelton, & Van Goozen, 2012; 
Iannou et al., 2013).  
Although responses on the mishap task are usually interpreted in terms of guilt, it is 
notable that the design of the task is such that children are not faced with a decision as to 
whether to act in a moral or prosocial way. Rather, they accidentally damage an object 
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belonging to someone else. Although children’s responses do seem to be predictive of certain 
aspects of development relevant to morality, it is not clear that the task measures the same 
type of emotion that we think of as guilt following a failure to make a moral or prosocial 
choice. Indeed, some researchers have suggested that it is better to describe this task as 
measuring post-transgressional distress rather than assuming it measures a specific moral 
emotion (Kim et al., 2014).  
Experimental studies of guilt in older children and adolescents have focused on moral 
choice, but have typically used self-report questionnaires or scenario-based tasks in which 
participants predict how they or someone else would feel if they had made a moral 
transgression or decided not to act prosocially (reviewed by Ferguson & Stegge, 1992). Many 
studies in this area have focused on the “happy victimizer” phenomenon (Nunner-Winkler & 
Sodian, 1988), whereby younger children attribute positive emotions to a moral transgressor 
(either themselves or a hypothetical character) who has achieved a desired outcome. There is 
a well-documented developmental increase during middle childhood in the likelihood that 
children will attribute some negative emotions to transgressors (Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; 
Arsenio & Lover, 1995; Keller, Lourenço, Malti, & Saalbach, 2003).  
Developmental changes in children’s performance on this task are widely interpreted 
as reflecting developmental changes in the ability to anticipate guilt (Malti, 2016; Malti & 
Dys, 2015; Malti, Gummerum, Keller, & Buchmann, 2009), with the emergence of this 
anticipatory ability assumed to have an effect on children’s moral and prosocial choices 
(Ongley & Malti, 2014; Malti, 2016). We note that it is at least possible that this task taps 
into the ability to anticipate regret (with its counterfactual component) as well as guilt; 
establishing this would require a more fine-tuned methodology that establishes the nature of 
the negative emotions that children predict. However, a limitation of this line of work is that, 
regardless of which negative emotion it examines, the happy victimizer paradigm (along with 
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other scenario-based measures) does not provide a direct measure of the emotion per se: Even 
under circumstances in which children are asked to imagine how they would feel if they were 
the victimizer (Keller et al., 2003), children are anticipating hypothetical emotions rather than 
reporting emotional experiences that result from real choices. This is important, because 
developmental research on intrapersonal regret suggests that children can experience regret 
before they can anticipate it, and that this experience itself has a direct impact on decision 
making (McCormack & Feeney, 2015; O’Connor et al., 2014).  
In summary, although there is a substantial literature on the development of guilt that 
has richly informed our understanding of the development of moral emotions and the role 
they may play in moral or prosocial development, it is not yet clear when children begin to 
experience interpersonal regret following a failure to make a moral or prosocial choice, and 
whether experiencing this emotion has an impact on children’s prosocial behavior. The aim 
of the current study was to examine these issues using a task in which children faced a real 
choice over whether to act prosocially.  
The Present Study 
The present study examined whether 5- to 9-year-old children reported a negative 
emotion on realizing that if they had made a choice to act prosocially, they would have 
avoided causing harm to another person. In the first phase of our task, children completed a 
worksheet by filling it in with stickers in order to win a small prize. They were then asked 
whether they wanted to donate a spare sticker to the next participant. The vast majority of 
children decided not to donate the sticker. We then showed children that the next child could 
not win a prize because they did not have enough stickers. At this point, we asked children to 
report their emotions using an emotion scale. Children did not know at this stage of the task 
that they had chosen to keep the specific sticker that the other child needed, and their emotion 
responses could have reflected their reaction to discovering that the other child could not win 
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a prize. In the final phase of the task, children found out that if they had donated the specific 
sticker that they had decided to keep, the other child would have been able to win the prize. 
Children were then asked a second time about how they felt relative to their first emotion 
rating (i.e., whether they now felt happier, sadder, or the same). This second rating examined 
whether they then felt sadder on being given information that allowed them to infer that it 
was their fault that the other child was disadvantaged, and only this subsequent rating was 
taken as an indication of whether they felt regret.  
We wanted to ensure that the emotion we measured reflected children’s responsibility 
for the negative outcome. Inspired by Weisberg and Beck’s (2012) study, we did this by 
distinguishing between circumstances in which children had the sticker the next child needed 
because they had chosen to keep the sticker (Experimental  condition), and those in which in 
which children had the necessary sticker but had not personally chosen to keep it. To do this, 
we introduced a condition – the Unintentional condition - in which the sticker was assigned 
to children by the throw of a (loaded) die. If children’s emotions reflect regret over their 
choice, then we would expect to see higher levels of reported negative emotions in the 
Experimental condition compared to the Unintentional condition.  
We also used an additional Control condition, in which children made the choice as to 
whether to keep the sticker, but the sticker they kept turned out not to be the specific sticker 
that the next child needed to win a prize. This condition differed from the Experimental  
condition in terms of the counterfactual that would have obtained if children who decided to 
keep the sticker had made a different choice: that is, if children had donated their sticker in 
the Control condition it would not have made any difference to whether the next child could 
win a prize, whereas it would have made a difference in the Experimental  condition. If 
children’s responses in the Experimental condition reflected their regret regarding their 
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choice, then we would anticipate that more children would report feeling sadder in that 
condition than in the Control condition.  
In summary, then, in Experiments 1 and 2, there were three conditions. The 
Experimental and Unintentional conditions did not differ from each other in terms of the 
counterfactual that would have obtained if children had not kept the sticker, but they did 
differ in terms of whether children were responsible for having kept the sticker. The 
Experimental and Control conditions both involved children being responsible for the choice 
as to whether to keep the sticker, but they differed from each other in the counterfactual that 
would have obtained if children had decided to donate the sticker. In Experiment 1, we used 
this paradigm with two age groups, 6- to 7-year-olds and 7- to 9-year-olds, to examine 
whether they showed evidence of interpersonal regret. We chose these age groups because 
the majority of studies of the development of intrapersonal regret suggest that children are 
capable of feeling regret by 6-7 years. To anticipate, because we found no age effects in 
Experiment 1, we ran a second experiment, the aim of which was to replicate the findings of 
Experiment 1 for the older group, and to examine if age effects emerged when a younger 
group of 5- to 6-year-olds was included. We included this younger age group because there is 
mixed evidence over whether children of this age experience intrapersonal regret (Amsel & 
Smalley, 2002; Van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2014; Weisberg & Beck, 2012).  
Whereas the aim of Experiments 1 and 2 was to try to establish whether children 
experience interpersonal regret, and at what age, Experiment 3 had a different aim. 
Specifically, this experiment examined whether the experience of interpersonal regret had a 
subsequent effect on children’s interpersonal decision making. If our paradigm is measuring a 
developmentally significant emotion, then we might expect the experience of this emotion to 
have a measurable effect on children’s behavior. In line with theories of regret that emphasize 
that experiencing regret can lead to a subsequent switch in the types of choices one makes 
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(O’Connor et al., 2014; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007), we predicted that children who 
experienced regret after failing to act prosocially would change their behavior when faced 
with another choice over whether to act prosocially or in a self-interested manner. 
Establishing this would not only provide evidence that our task is measuring a functionally 
significant emotion, it would also provide support in a distinctive interpersonal context for 
the claim that regret has an impact on decision making.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. A total of 197 children aged 6- to 9 years (99 females) participated in 
this study.  Children were divided into two groups on the basis of their school years, with a 
younger group consisting of children drawn from two consecutive school years and an older 
group of children from the subsequent two school years.  This resulted in a younger group of 
6- to 7-year olds consisting of 90 children (46 female) aged 73-88 months with a mean age of 
80 months.  In the older group of 7- to 9-year-olds there were 107 children (55 female) aged 
88-117 months with a mean age of 101 months. All participants were Caucasian except for 
three who were of Asian ethnic origin.  Children were sampled using volunteer sampling via 
parental consent letters from schools that served all socio-economic groups. Children were 
randomly assigned to one of 3 conditions: Experimental, Unintentional and Control.  Within 
the younger group, 28 children were in the Experimental condition, 29 were in the 
Unintentional condition and 33 were in the Control condition.  Within the older group, 40 
were in the Experimental condition, 31 in the Unintentional condition and 36 in the Control 
condition.   
Materials. In the interpersonal regret task, the following materials were used: a single 
large, plain envelope containing six small, plain envelopes each holding a single sticker 
depicting a unique Pokemon along with a colored landscape picture depicting five unique 
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silhouettes each of which matched the outlines of five of the stickers.  The task also required 
a similar set of materials that were described as those to be used by the next child.  For this 
another colored landscape picture with five silhouettes (one of which was different to the 
silhouettes on the participant's sheet, the other four of which were the same) was used along 
with a large, plain envelope containing five small, plain envelopes each of which held a 
single sticker.   
To obtain self-reports of emotions, a 5-point scale was used which ranged from very 
sad to very happy, along with a 3-pronged arrow (following O’Connor et al., 2012, 2014, and 
Weisberg & Beck, 2012).  The 3-pronged arrow was a cardboard shape consisting of three 
arrowheads.  The 5-point scale comprised five unnumbered faces ranging from a very happy 
face on the left to a very sad face on the right, with a slightly happy face located to the right 
of the very happy face, a slightly sad face located to the left of the very sad face and a neutral 
face in the middle of the other faces. In order to train children how to use this scale, a gorilla 
puppet, an elephant puppet, three toy strawberries, one toy orange and one toy apple were 
used.  A loaded die with three red sides and three blue sides (always landing on blue) was 
used in the Unintentional condition, ostensibly to determine whether children donated or did 
not donate a spare sticker. Finally, a bag of small toys was used as a prize; it contained a 
rubber, bouncing ball, notepad and jigsaw puzzle. 
Procedure. Each participant was first taught how to use the 3-pronged arrow with the 
5-point scale. The experimenter initially showed children that the vertical prong of the arrow 
could be placed such that it pointed to one of the faces on the scale.  The arrow was then 
pointed at each face in turn, and the experimenter described the emotion indicated by that 
face (ranging from "very happy" through to "very sad").  After children had understood this, 
the experimenter explained that the leftward prong of the arrow meant "even happier" and the 
rightward pointing prong meant "even sadder".  Two different puppets (elephant and gorilla) 
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were then used to provide an example of how the scale and arrow worked.  A puppet was 
given a piece of toy fruit and the child was told the puppet was slightly happy (with the arrow 
being placed on the slightly happy face) then the puppet had one fruit taken from her and 
children were asked how the puppet felt now and asked to show it using the scale and the 3-
pronged arrow; the correct response involved saying the puppet was sadder using the 
rightward pointing prong of the arrow. Using the scale, children were told that another puppet 
was “very sad” at losing all but one of their pieces of fruit; the final piece of fruit was taken 
away from the puppet and the experimenter asked children whether the puppet felt happier, 
sadder or the same after losing all of their fruit. The correct response was for the child to 
point at the "even sadder" prong, which in fact pointed off the scale. A similar procedure was 
used to show how to report feeling “even happier”, which involved giving another puppet 
pieces of fruit rather than taking them away.  Children had to give the correct responses in the 
training phase to move on to the interpersonal regret task.   
Interpersonal regret task: Sticker task. The experimenter gave children a colored 
landscape picture depicting five silhouettes of different Pokemon characters. The 
experimenter then removed five small envelopes from a large envelope (in full view of the 
child) and gave them to the child with instructions to stick each sticker on the correct 
silhouette. Children were told that if they succeeded in sticking all stickers on the correct 
silhouettes, they would be given a prize. After children had finished matching the stickers to 
the silhouettes, they were given the small bag of prizes. The experimenter then feigned 
surprise at finding another small envelope with a sixth sticker in the large envelope.  The 
sticker was different to the other ones that children had already seen, and did not match any 
of the silhouettes on their sheet. In the Unintentional condition, children were told that they 
would play a game to decide if they got to keep the spare sticker or not.  The experimenter 
then produced a loaded die with three red and three blue sides and told the children that if the 
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die landed on blue they could keep the sticker.  In fact the die was loaded to always land on 
blue, so children always got to keep the sticker in this condition.  After receiving their sticker, 
children were told that another child was coming to play the game after them, and shown the 
large envelope containing the stickers for the "next person".  The experimenter removed four 
envelopes from the "next person's" large envelope, feigning surprise that it contained only 
four rather than five envelopes.  Children were also shown that the next person had to match 
five stickers to the blank silhouettes on a sheet, just as they had to do themselves previously.  
The experimenter asked children - "Are four stickers enough for the next person to win a 
prize?"; all children answered this question correctly.  
Children were then asked by the experimenter: "How do you feel knowing that the 
next person can't win a prize?  Can you show me using these pictures you used earlier?" 
Children rated their emotions on the 5-point scale using the upward prong of the 3-pronged 
arrow, yielding the initial emotion rating.  After this rating, the experimenter showed children 
that the sticker the “next person” was missing was the sticker they had won from the throw of 
the loaded die.  The experimenter checked that children understood this by asking: "Is this the 
sticker the next person needs to win a prize?", after showing children that the extra sticker 
they had kept matched one of the silhouettes on the sheet.  When the experimenter was 
satisfied that children understood that they had the sticker the next person needed, they were 
asked to report their emotion using the 3-pronged arrow and the same scale.  The 
experimenter showed children the scale, with the upward pointing arrow indicating the 
emotion that children had felt on finding out that the next person could not win a prize; he 
then asked children whether they now felt "happier", "sadder" or "the same", pointing to each 
prong of the arrow in turn.  Children chose one prong of the 3-pronged arrow. After children 
had reported how they now felt the experimenter feigned surprise at finding the fifth sticker 
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the “next person” needed in their large envelope.  This was done in order to reassure children 
that the next person would be able to win a prize after all.  
In the Experimental condition the same procedure was followed.  However, instead of 
rolling a loaded die to determine if children got to keep the extra sticker or had to give it to 
the “next person”, children were asked: "Well, you already won your prize but would you 
like to keep this sticker as well as your prize?  Or would you rather give it to the next child 
who is going to play the game to help them get a prize?  The next child has to play the same 
game as you just played. Remember, the next child will need five stickers to win a prize like 
you did. Do you want to give them this sticker to help them win a prize or keep it for 
yourself?"  Children were then allowed to choose freely whether or not they wanted to keep 
the sticker or donate it to help the “next person”.  Children were made fully aware that this 
choice was entirely theirs and no attempt was made to affect their choice.  For children who 
decided to keep the sticker (the majority), the task then proceeded in an identical manner to 
the procedure in the Unintentional condition.  For those children who donated the sticker, the 
outcome of the procedure differed slightly, insofar as it later became apparent that they had 
donated a sticker that the other child needed in order to win a prize. Children who donated the 
sticker nevertheless were asked to self-report their emotions just as in the Unintentional 
condition. The Control condition was identical to the Experimental condition, except that the 
sticker children had kept was not the specific sticker the next child needed to win a prize.  
Results and Discussion 
Of the 197 participants, 17 chose to donate their sticker in the Sticker task rather than 
keep it (2 from the younger group and 15 from the older group; see Supplementary Analysis 
for further information on these children).  All donors were removed from further analysis 
resulting in a final sample size of 180 participants (90 female) with 60 in each condition.  
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We first examined the initial emotion ratings given by children on discovering that the 
next child did not have enough stickers to win a prize. Children’s ratings were converted to 
numerical values, with 1 = very sad and 5 = very happy. The mean rating was 2.01 (SD = 
1.08). A two-way ANOVA was conducted on these ratings with between subjects factors of 
Age Group and Condition. The main effect of Age Group was not significant, F(1, 174) = 
1.55, p = .21, ηp2 = .009, and the main effect of Condition and the interaction between Age 
Group and Condition were also not significant, both Fs < 1. Thus, children’s emotions on 
initially discovering that the other child could not win a prize were generally negative and did 
not differ across conditions.  
Children pointed to one prong of a 3-pronged arrow to report whether they now felt 
the same, happier, or sadder on discovering which sticker the next child was missing, 
yielding categorical data. Figure 1 shows the number of children in each age group and 
condition giving each type of emotional response (happier, sadder, or the same) on 
discovering whether the sticker that they had kept was the one needed by the next child.  It 
can be seen from the figure that the only condition in which the majority of children reported 
feeling sadder was the Experimental condition. In the Control condition, in which children 
discovered that the sticker they had kept was not the one the next child needed, “same” was 
the majority response in the younger group and “happier” the most common response in the 
older group. There was no clear preferred response in either group in the Unintentional 
condition.  
The important analyses concern whether the number of children who reported feeling 
sadder differed by condition; if the condition manipulation was successful, children should be 
more likely to feel sadder in the Experimental than the other two conditions. Table 1 shows 
the percentage of children who reported feeling sadder as a function of age group and 
condition. We conducted a binary logistic regression to examine the variables that predicted 
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the number of children who felt sadder. We included the predictors of age group, gender, 
condition (categorical variable, with the Experimental condition as the reference category), 
and children’s initial emotion rating. We included initial emotion rating because, although 
there were no age or condition effects on these ratings, it is possible that these initial ratings 
could affect children’s tendency to report whether they subsequently felt sadder. In the first 
step we entered only age group, gender and children’s initial emotion rating into the model. 
The model at this stage was no better than the null model, χ2 (3) = 4.87, p > .05. In the second 
step, we entered condition as a variable into the model. This model was a significant 
improvement over the model at step one, χ2 (2) = 22.89, p < .001. In a third step, we entered 
the interaction between condition and age group as a variable, but this led to no significant 
improvement in fit, χ2 (2) = 0.09, p > .05, so the interaction term was not included in  the 
final version of the model. Table 2 shows the findings of the regression analysis for the full 
model. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test of goodness-of-fit indicated that the final model provided 
a good overall fit for the data. It can be seen from the table that only significant predictor of 
the number of children who felt sadder was condition, which was a significant predictor both 
when comparing the Experimental condition and the UnIntentional condition and when 
comparing the Experimental condition and the Control condition; there was no significant 
effect of age group, gender, or initial emotion rating.  
Chi-squared analyses examined whether the number of children who felt sadder 
versus not sadder differed as a function of condition. These analyses showed that the 
difference between the Experimental and the UnIntentional conditions was significant, χ2 (N 
= 120) = 14.80, df = 1, p < .001; similarly, the difference between the Experimental and the 
Control conditions was significant χ2 (N = 120) = 19.55, df = 1, p < .001. The Control and 
Intentional conditions did not differ from each other, χ2 (N = 120) = 0.39 , df = 1, p > .05 
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In summary, in the Experimental condition in the Sticker task, around 59% of the 6- 
to 7-year-old children and 67% of the 7- to 9-year-old children reported feeling sadder when 
they discovered that the sticker that they had decided to keep was the one the next child 
needed to win a prize. This pattern of responses differed from that in the Unintentional 
condition, in which it was not children’s choice to keep the sticker, and it also differed from 
that in the Control condition in which children found out that the sticker that they had kept 
was not the one the next child was missing. Thus, for both age groups, children only felt 
sadder when they had personally made a choice that turned out to disadvantage another 
person. We interpret this pattern of findings as suggesting that children in the Experimental 
group felt regret as a result of their choice. Our findings suggest that children can experience 
interpersonal regret from at least around 6 to 7 years. This finding is compatible with those of 
the majority of other studies of the development of regret (Burns et al., 2012; O'Connor et al., 
2012, 2014; O'Connor, McCormack, Beck & Feeney, 2015; Van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2014; 
Weisberg & Beck, 2010; 2012), although previous studies have only examined intrapersonal 
regret. In our second experiment, we included a younger group of 5- to 6-year-olds to explore 
whether there was any evidence of interpersonal regret before 6 to 7 years; we also wanted to 
replicate our findings for the older age group given that this is a new task. 
Experiment 2  
Method 
Participants. A total of 194 children aged 5 to 9 years (99 females) participated in 
this study.  Children were divided into two groups on the basis of their school years, with a 
younger group consisting of children drawn from two consecutive school years and an older 
group of children from two older consecutive school years.  This resulted in younger group 
consisting of 85 5- to 6-year-olds (42 female) aged 60-81 months with a mean age of 71 
months and older group of children consisting of 109 7- to 9-year-olds (57 female) aged 93-
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117 months with a mean age of 103 months. Children were divided into 3 conditions: 
Experimental, Unintentional and Control.  Within the younger group, 29 children were in the 
Experimental condition, 27 were in the Unintentional condition and 29 were in the Control 
condition.  Within the older group, 38 were in the Experimental condition, 33 in the 
Unintentional condition and 38 in the Control condition. All participants were Caucasian and 
children were sampled using volunteer sampling via parental consent letters from schools that 
served all socio-economic bands. 
Materials and Procedure. These were identical to those used in Experiment 1. 
Results and Discussion 
Of the 194 children, 14 chose to donate their sticker rather than keep it (one from the 
younger group and13 from the older group). All donors were removed from further analysis 
resulting in a final sample size of 180 participants (91 female) with 60 in each condition.      
We first examined the initial emotion ratings given by children on discovering that the 
next child did not have enough stickers to win a prize by converting children’s ratings to 
numerical values, with 1 = very sad and 5 = very happy. The mean rating was 2.10 (SD = 
1.12). A two-way ANOVA was conducted on these ratings with between subjects factors of 
Age Group and Condition. The main effect of Age Group was not significant, F < 1. 
However, the main effect of Condition was significant, F(2, 174) = 6.07, p = .003, ηp2 = .065, 
although the interaction between Condition and Age Group was non-significant, F < 1. Mean 
ratings were highest for the Unintentional condition, 2.47 (SD = 1.00), and lower for the 
Experimental Condition were 2.01 (SD = 1.21), and the Control condition, 1.77 (SD = 1.12). 
Subsequent t-tests showed that the ratings in the former condition differed from those in the 
other two conditions, t(118) = -1.98, p = .05, t(118) = 3.72, p < .001, but the latter two 
conditions did not differ.  
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Figure 2 shows the number of children in each age group and condition giving each 
type of emotional response (happier, sadder, or the same) on discovering whether the sticker 
that they had kept was the one needed by the next child.  It can be seen from the figure that 
the only condition in which the majority of children reported feeling sadder was the 
Experimental condition, and this was only the case for the 7- to 9-year-old group.  
Table 1 shows the percentage of children who felt sadder as a function of age group 
and condition. As in the analysis of the data from Experiment 1, we conducted a binary 
logistic regression to examine whether any variables predicted the number of children who 
felt sadder using the predictors of age group, gender, condition, and children’s initial emotion 
rating. In the first step, we included age group, gender and children’s initial emotion rating as 
variables into the model. The model at this stage was no better than the null model, χ2 (3) = 
4.49, p > .05. In the second step, we entered condition as a variable into the model. This 
model was a significant improvement over the model at step one, χ2 (2) = 13.03, p < .01. In a 
third step, we entered the interaction between condition and age group as a variable, and this 
led to a significant improvement in fit, χ2 (2) = 11.77, p < .01, so the interaction term was 
included in the final version of the model. Table 3 shows the results of the regression 
analysis, with the Experimental condition functioning as the reference category. The Hosmer-
Lemeshow test of goodness-of-fit indicated that the final model provided a good overall fit 
for the data.  The interaction between age group and condition was significant, both for the 
comparison between the Experimental condition and the Unintentional condition, and for the 
comparison between the Experimental and the Control condition. Gender and initial emotion 
rating were not significant predictors.  
Given that the interaction term in the regression model was significant, chi-squared 
analyses examined whether the number of children who felt sadder versus not sadder differed 
as a function of condition, separately for each age group. These analyses showed that the 
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difference between the Experimental and the Intentional conditions was not significant for the 
5- to 6-year-olds, χ2 (N = 56) = 0.22, df = 1, p = .64, but was significant for the 7- to 9-year-
olds, χ2 (N = 64) = 15.97, df = 1, p < .001; similarly, the difference between the Experimental 
and the Control conditions was not significant for the 5- to 6-year-olds, χ2 (N = 57) = 0.49, df 
= 1, p = .83, but was for the older group, χ2 (N = 63) = 17.28, df = 1, p < .001. Chi-squared 
analyses were also used to examine whether there were effects of age on the number of 
children who felt sadder versus not sadder, separately for each condition. There was a 
significant effect of age on the number of children who felt sadder in the Experimental 
condition, χ2 (N = 60) = 13.03; df = 2; p < .001, but not in the other two conditions, both ps > 
.44. Thus, only the older children felt sadder more often in the Experimental condition than 
the other two conditions, and they were significantly more likely to feel sadder in this 
condition than the younger children.  
In summary, unlike in Experiment 1, in this experiment we found age effects on 
performance in the Sticker task. The younger group in this study were 5- to 6-year-olds, 
whereas they were 6- to 7-year-olds in Experiment 1. Fewer than 30% of the younger 
children reported feeling sadder in the Experimental condition, which measured interpersonal 
regret. Their performance contrasted with that of the older group, with around 74% of 
children reporting feeling sadder in the interpersonal regret task in Experiment 2. The 
findings of Experiment 2 in combination of those from Experiment 1 suggest a lower limit in 
the age at which children feel intrapersonal regret, with 5- to 6-year-olds not reporting this 
emotion but this emotion being present in children a year older (the 6- to 7-year-olds in 
Experiment 1).  
Experiment 3 
Regret is typically viewed as a functional emotion that can improve decision making 
(Roese, 2005; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007), because regretting a course of action that led to a 
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poor outcome can lead one choosing differently when subsequently faced with similar 
choices. Importantly for the idea that regret is a functional emotion, O’Connor et al. (2014) 
demonstrated that children who experience regret in an intrapersonal regret task are more 
likely to make a different choice when faced with the same decision again a day later. This 
finding suggests that the developmental emergence of regret affects children’s decision 
making.  
It also suggests the interesting hypothesis that experiencing regret about a failure to 
make a prosocial choice might affect the likelihood that children subsequently act 
prosocially. Our final experiment directly tested that hypothesis. In Experiment 3, we 
examined whether children experienced regret in the interpersonal regret task after failing to 
donate a sticker, by getting children to complete the Experimental condition of the Sticker 
task used in Experiments 1 and 2. We then explored whether children who regretted failing to 
donate were more likely to make prosocial choices in a completely different economic choice 
task. We adapted the economic choice task used by Fehr, Bernhard, and Rockenbach (2008) 
in which children completed a number of trials that involved choosing between two possible 
distributions of tokens, with some tokens to be kept by children themselves and some to be 
given to another (unidentified) child. In this task, the options always differ in terms of how 
beneficial they are to the other child and of interest is whether children select the kinder 
option. The trials vary in terms of whether choosing the kinder option is disadvantageous to 
the chooser themselves or inequitable.  
We tested the hypothesis that children who experienced regret on the Sticker task 
were subsequently more likely to make choices that benefit another child in the economic 
choice task. An association between experiencing regret on the Sticker task and making 
kinder choices could occur for two reasons. It could occur because the experience of regret 
itself affects children’s subsequent decisions, or it could occur because of individual 
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differences that separately make it more likely that children experience regret and also make 
kinder choices in the economic choice task. To distinguish between these possibilities, 
children were divided into two groups, with half of the children first completing the Sticker 
task, followed by the economic choice task, and half completing the tasks in the reverse 
order. If experiencing regret results in children making kinder choices, then an association 
between experiencing regret and kinder choices in the economic choice task should only 
occur if children have completed the interpersonal regret task first.  
Method 
Participants. Participants were 134 6- to 7-year-olds (66 females; M = 86 months, 
Range = 73 - 96 months). Half of the group was randomly assigned to one of two task orders 
(Economic First or Regret First conditions).  All of the participants were Caucasian except 
two who were of Asian ethnic origin.  All children were sampled using volunteer sampling 
via parental consent letters from schools that served all socio-economic bands.  
Materials. For the interpersonal regret task, these were identical to those used in 
Experiments 1 and 2. For the Economic task, six laminated pages were used. Three had an 
arrow pointing upwards, and each one had a different number of circular tokens depicted on it 
(0, 1, and 2); the other three had an arrow pointing downwards and similarly had a number of 
tokens depicted on it (0, 1, and 2).  A generic drawing of a classroom of children was also 
used for this task along with some plastic tokens that could be exchanged for stickers. 
Procedure. The procedure for training children to use the emotion scale was the same 
as in Experiments 1 and 2, and the procedure for the interpersonal regret (Sticker) task was 
the same as used in the Experimental condition in Experiments 1 and 2. For the economic 
choice task (adapted from Fehr et al., 2008), there was a training in phase in which children 
were initially introduced to two puppets and two pairs of laminated pages were placed 
between the puppets showing different distributions of rewards. Children were required to 
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correctly answer questions about the nature of the choice facing one of the puppets in the 
training phase before moving on to the main task.  
Children were informed that they were going to play the game themselves, and that 
the pictures showed how many tokens they would win and how many “another person” from 
their class would win. Following Fehr et al. (2008), it was not specified who this other child 
was. The sets of pictured choices were placed in between the child and the drawing of 
children in a classroom, with arrows pointing downwards towards the child and upwards 
towards the drawing.  Children were told that they had to choose one pair of pages (or one 
"side of the table”).  There were three different trials in the economic choice task: Envy 
[choice was between (1, 1) and (1, 2); i.e., between each child receiving two tokens, or the 
choosing child winning one token and the other child two tokens], Prosocial [choice was 
between (1,1) and (1, 0)] and Sharing [choice was between (1, 1) and (2,0)]. The order in 
which these trials were administered was varied between children. Following completion of 
each trial, the appropriate number of tokens was distributed, and children were able to swap 
their tokens for stickers of their choice at the end of task. Children in each condition 
performed both the interpersonal regret task and the economic choice task, with the only 
difference being the order in which the tasks were completed.  
Results and Discussion 
Of the 134 participants, 6 chose to donate their sticker rather than keep it.  All donors 
were removed from subsequent analysis, resulting in a final sample size of 128 children. 
The mean initial emotion ratings on discovering that the other child could not win a 
prize was 1.99 (SD = 1.18).  An ANOVA with a between subjects factor of Task Order 
(Regret First versus Economic First) found no significant effect on these initial ratings, F < 1. 
Children who subsequently reported feeling sadder on discovering that the other child could 
have won a prize if they had donated the necessary sticker were classified as regretters on the 
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interpersonal regret task (59.4% of children); those who rated themselves as feeling the same 
(15.6%) or happier (25%) were classified as non-regretters. Regression analysis was used to 
examine the number of children who were classified as regretters using the predictors of 
gender, age (in months), and Task Order. A model containing these three predictors did not 
differ significantly from the null model, χ2(3) = 2.84, p > .05, and none of the three predictors 
was significant, all ps > .05.  
Choices on each trial of the Economic game were classified in terms of whether 
children made the choice that was most beneficial to the other child; this was the (1,1) choice 
in the Prosocial and Sharing trials, and in Envy trial it was the (1, 2) choice. Figure 3 shows 
the percentage of kinder choices as function of Task Order and whether children experienced 
regret. It can be seen from Figure 3 that kinder choices were highest in the Prosocial trial (in 
which this choice did not disadvantage the choosing child), followed by the Sharing Trial (in 
which this choice did disadvantage the choosing child), and were lowest in the Envy trial (in 
which this choice conflicted with the most egalitarian choice, but had no advantage or 
disadvantage for the choosing child). The highest proportion of kinder choices was in the 
group of regretters in the Regret First condition. Analyses showed that in this condition there 
was an association between experiencing regret and making the kinder choice in the Prosocial 
trial, χ2 (N = 65) = 6.79; df = 1; p = .009, and in the Sharing trial, χ2 (N = 65) = 7.49; df = 1; p 
= .006, but not in the Envy trial, χ2 (N = 65) = 0.93; df = 1; p = .760. Regretters who 
completed the Regret task first were more likely to make the kinder choice in the Prosocial 
and Sharing trials than non-regretters. However, there was no association between 
experiencing regret and making the prosocial choice in any of the trial types in the Economic 
First condition, all χ2 (N = 63) < 1.7; df = 1; ps > .270.  
Children who regretted failing to donate a resource were more likely to make kinder 
choices in a separate task. However, this association between experiencing regret and kinder 
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choices in the economic game only held for that group of children who completed the 
interpersonal regret task first. This suggests that it was the actual experience of regret that 
resulted in children subsequently making a larger number of kinder choices, rather than there 
being individual differences that separately increased the likelihood that children felt 
interpersonal regret and the likelihood that children made kinder choices in the economic 
choice task. These findings indicate that experiencing interpersonal regret regarding a choice 
that has a negative impact on another person can facilitate subsequent prosocial behavior in 
children. 
General Discussion 
This study was the first to directly examine the development of interpersonal regret, 
and also to explore the impact of this type of regret on children’s prosocial behavior. There 
were two key findings. First, by the time children are aged 6-7, the majority of them are 
capable of experiencing interpersonal regret. However, we found no evidence of this type of 
regret in children younger than this age. Second, experiencing this emotion has an impact on 
the subsequent choices that 6-7-year-olds make: children who experience interpersonal regret 
are more likely subsequently to make kinder choices than children who do not experience this 
emotion. This suggests that when interpersonal regret emerges developmentally, it may have 
an effect on children’s prosocial behavior, just as the emergence of intrapersonal regret seems 
to impact on children’s decision making involving self-interested choices (O’Connor et al., 
2014).  
The development of interpersonal regret 
 Why might the 5- to 6-year-olds have failed to show regret in our task? We can 
distinguish between at least three possible explanations that we will consider in turn. First, it 
may be that these younger children do feel regret but find it difficult to report on their 
emotions in our paradigm. Our findings suggest that this interpretation is not correct: younger 
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children were just as likely as older children to report feeling sad about the fact that the next 
child could not win a prize in their initial emotion ratings. Where they differed from the older 
children was in whether they subsequently felt sadder on discovering that the specific sticker 
that they had decided to keep was the one the other child needed. As discussed further below, 
we interpret this as a measure of regret, because older children’s negative emotions seem 
specifically underpinned by the thought that they had had the opportunity to make a different 
choice (to donate the sticker), which would have enabled the other child to win a prize.  
 This brings us to a second possible interpretation of the younger children’s 
difficulties, which is that they may have had problems either generating or using 
counterfactuals appropriately. Regret requires being able to consider a counterfactual 
alternative in which a different outcome had occurred, and evaluatively comparing that 
outcome to the one that actually obtained. As Beck Riggs, and Burns (2011) have argued, 
experiencing regret thus typically requires not just the ability to think counterfactually, but 
also the ability to flexibly switch between representations of the actual and counterfactual 
world in order to make the appropriate evaluative comparisons. On this basis, they argued 
that domain-general cognitive flexibility is critical in the development of regret. Some 
evidence for this claim comes from Burns et al.’s (2012) study, in which a measure of 
attentional flexibility predicted whether children experienced intrapersonal regret. 
Furthermore, Beck and Crilly (2009) have argued that making such evaluative comparisons 
requires a grasp of the nature of possibility, i.e., an understanding that the counterfactual 
event is one that could possibly have replaced the actual event, with such a grasp being 
known to develop later than the ability to pass typical counterfactual reasoning tasks (see 
Beck et al., 2006).  
Given these claims, the difficulties that we have observed in our younger children 
could be general difficulties with experiencing regret that would apply both to intrapersonal 
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and interpersonal regret and stem from the cognitive demands of evaluatively comparing 
actual and counterfactual outcomes. The plausibility of this suggestion hinges on whether it 
can be assumed that children of this age would also not show intrapersonal regret, and, as 
mentioned in the introduction, there is mixed evidence regarding this issue (e.g., Amsel & 
Smalley, 2002, Rafetseder & Perner, 2012; Weisberg & Beck, 2012); a comparison of 
children’s performance on our task and on an intrapersonal regret task would help establish 
whether younger children’s difficulties are due to more generalized problems in experiencing 
regret. 
Because it is not clear at this stage whether the differences between the younger and 
the older children’s performances in our task can be attributed to a domain-general inability 
to experience regret in the younger children, it is worth also mentioning a third possibility, 
which is that the younger group’s failure to show negative emotions stems specifically from 
the interpersonal character of the decision-making context. From a socio-cognitive 
perspective, our interpersonal regret task could be seen as making a demand not required by 
intrapersonal regret. In intrapersonal regret tasks, the actual and counterfactual outcomes that 
need to be evaluatively compared are (i) readily apparent (typically they are visually on 
display) and (ii) differ straightforwardly in terms of their value to the self (e.g., one candy is 
not as good as five candies). However, in our intrapersonal regret task, the process involves a 
consideration of the differential effect of each choice option on another person, which is in 
itself an exercise in perspective-taking, an evaluative comparison of the merits of the 
contrasting choices (actual and counterfactual) yielding these outcomes, and a recognition of 
one’s personal responsibility in determining the outcome. While components of these 
individual socio-cognitive abilities may already be available in young children, coordinating 
them with counterfactual thinking might itself be demanding.  
Regret and guilt 
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We have described our task as measuring interpersonal regret in children rather than 
guilt. We are aware, though, that there is disagreement in the existing literature over whether 
interpersonal regret should be distinguished from guilt, and if so on what basis (Berndsen et 
al., 2010; Breugelmans, Zeelenberg, Gilovich, Huang, & Shani, 2014; Kedia & Hilton, 2011; 
Roseman, Weist, & Swartz, 1994; Zeelenberg & Breugelmans, 2008). Berndsen et al. (2010, 
p. 67) suggest that “guilt is a more appropriate term than regret to describe feelings of 
emotional distress in situations of interpersonal harm. Similarly, regret seems a more 
appropriate emotion in situations of intrapersonal harm.” On their approach, it would seem to 
be more appropriate to describe the negative emotions measured here as guilt rather than as 
regret, and perhaps to dispense with the term “interpersonal regret” entirely.  
One problem with adopting such an approach in the context of our study, though, is 
that it makes difficult to explain the differences we observed between the responses of the 
younger and the older children, since other studies indicate that even very young children can 
experience negative emotions after causing interpersonal harm, which may plausibly be 
described as guilt, and have in fact been termed thus by the researchers carrying out the 
relevant studies (Barrett et al., 1993; Kochanska et al., 2002). We interpret our task as 
measuring a different, or more specific, type of negative emotion. Furthermore, we think that 
drawing a distinction between interpersonal regret and guilt is also recommended by two 
other sets of considerations: (a) one concerning the types of thoughts, experiences, and action 
tendencies associated with them, and (b) one concerning the extent to which they are 
necessarily underpinned by counterfactual thought.    
 Beginning with (a), studies that have examined judgments regarding the nature of 
emotions occurring in interpersonal contexts indicate that it is possible to distinguish between 
guilt and interpersonal regret on the grounds that each of them seems to be associated with a 
different set of thought patterns and action tendencies (Breugelmans et al., 2014; Roseman et 
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al., 1994; Zeelenberg & Breugelmans, 2008). Specifically, Breugelmans et al. show that guilt 
is associated with the sense of having morally transgressed alongside the action tendency to 
apologize or seek to be forgiven, whereas interpersonal regret is associated with a sense of 
feeling responsible for having made a mistake and the action tendency to do things differently 
in the future (see also Roseman et al., 1994, for very similar findings). Indeed, in a cross-
cultural study they show that, unlike in a Western sample who most frequently experience 
intrapersonal regret, in a Taiwanese sample regret was most frequently experienced in 
interpersonal contexts, while still remaining distinct from guilt along the same dimensions in 
both samples. This cross-cultural data provides a compelling reason for maintaining a 
distinction between interpersonal regret and guilt. 
Turning to (b), the issue of whether guilt and regret differ in terms of the involvement 
of counterfactual thought has not been to the fore in research conducted with adults, perhaps 
because their counterfactual reasoning abilities can be assumed. By contrast, in a 
developmental context where mature counterfactual reasoning abilities cannot be assumed, it 
becomes much more pressing to consider the role of counterfactual thought, and we believe 
that it is useful to distinguish between negative emotions arising from interpersonal harm that 
do or do not require such thought. The distinction between emotions that do or do not require 
counterfactual thought is supported by considerable evidence from neuropsychological 
studies that have focused on intrapersonal rather than interpersonal regret. Such studies 
indicate that there are distinctive brain processes involved in counterfactual evaluation that 
underpin the experience of intrapersonal regret following choices with consequences that are 
sub-optimal for the self (e.g., Chua, Gonzalez, Taylor, Welsh, & Liberzon, 2009; Giorgetta et 
al., 2013; Sommer, Peters, Gläscher & Büchel, 2009). Our suggestion is that a similar 
distinction between negative emotions that do or do not require counterfactual thought can be 
made in the case of choices with consequences that are sub-optimal or harmful for another 
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person. Thus, we suggest reserving the term interpersonal regret for the emotion that requires 
such counterfactual thought, in line with the long-standing psychological definition of regret 
as a counterfactual emotion (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995; Landman, 1993) that has been 
supported by the more recent neuropsychological evidence.  
Taken together, these considerations suggest that in interpreting our task as measuring 
regret rather than guilt, two parallel issues need to be considered: (a) whether children’s 
negative emotions in our task are likely to have the characteristics that previous studies have 
found to be associated with guilt or those associated with regret (Breugelmans et al., 2014; 
Roseman et al., 1994) and (b) whether these emotions involve counterfactual thought.  
With regard to (b), our control and non-intentional conditions rule out the possibility 
that children’s negative emotions are underpinned by a simple thought that only has a 
present-tense content such as “I have the sticker that the other child needs”. The contrast 
between the findings in the Experimental condition and the other two conditions means that 
children’s negative emotions that we are interpreting as regret must be underpinned by 
thoughts about (i) their own past choice (which was instrumental in the Experimental but not 
Unintentional condition) and (ii) the consequences of this choice for the other child (which 
differed between the Experimental and Control conditions). What is at issue is whether (ii) 
required a consideration not just of the fact that the other child cannot win a prize because 
they kept the sticker but also of the counterfactual thought that if they had donated the 
sticker, the other child would have been able to win. In previous studies that attempt to elicit 
guilt in toddlers (Barrett et al., 1993; Kochanska et al., 2002), children’s negative emotions 
are likely to straightforwardly reflect the undesirable and immediately apparent consequences 
of their actions (e.g., the broken toy in the mishap paradigm). That is, it does not seem 
parsimonious to assume that children must also be entertaining the thought that if they had 
not carried out an action, the harm would have been avoided (i.e., the toy would still be 
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intact). Indeed the majority of developmental psychologists would assume that such 
counterfactual thoughts are beyond the cognitive capabilities of very young children 
 In our task, by contrast, negative consequences arise not because children acted in a 
harmful way per se (indeed, in the Control condition their action did not cause harm) but as a 
knock-on effect of their failure to donate, given the nature of the circumstances. Unlike in the 
guilt-eliciting paradigms, in our task children are in a situation of missed opportunity: they 
had the opportunity to act in such a way that would have subsequently prevented a negative 
outcome for another child (although they did not know this at the time of acting), but they did 
not take up this opportunity. We believe it is most plausible to interpret negative emotions in 
our task in this way: as a recognition that, under the circumstances, the failure to act 
prosocially meant that the child had missed an opportunity to help. Negative emotions 
following missed opportunities are underpinned by counterfactual content, and indeed have 
been characterized as the prototypical example of regret (Beike, Markman, & Karadogan, 
2009). Notably, an advantage of this interpretation is that it also provides a coherent way of 
explaining the age patterns that we report, assuming developmental changes in counterfactual 
reasoning skills. However, although we believe it is highly plausible to assume that children’s 
negative emotions are underpinned by this counterfactual thought, future research should 
explore more directly the role of counterfactual thought in children’s responses in our task. 
One way to do this would be to ask children to generate explanations for their emotion 
responses; research by O’Connor et al. (2012) suggests that it is possible to code such 
responses for their counterfactual content. 
We now turn to issue (a): whether the associated thoughts/experiences and action 
tendencies are likely to be those aligned with regret rather than guilt. As we already 
mentioned, previous studies suggest that guilt but not interpersonal regret is associated with 
experiencing a distinctive sense of having morally transgressed and an action tendency to 
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seek forgiveness or apologize, whereas regret is associated with a feeling of responsibility 
and the action tendency to do things differently. The findings of our studies indicate that the 
negative emotion children experience is highly likely to be associated with a feeling of 
responsibility (it is observable only in the Experimental condition in which children are in 
fact responsible). Furthermore, we provide compelling evidence in Experiment 3, which we 
discuss in the next section, that children’s experiencing of this emotion is associated with the 
action tendency to behave differently. In both these respects, then, this emotion appears to 
have the characteristics of regret. We did not assess whether children had the action tendency 
to seek forgiveness or a sense of having made a distinctively moral transgression. However, 
we note that while children missed an opportunity to help another child, it is not clear in the 
paradigm that their action was obviously immoral. At the time of making their choice, 
children had no good reason to believe that keeping the sticker would result in harm to the 
next child (this was deliberately left ambiguous), and children might justifiably have assumed 
that the experimenter would provide enough stickers for every child to complete the task. 
Thus, this may be a situation in which regret is appropriate (because an opportunity to help 
was missed) but guilt is not necessarily appropriate (because children did not intend to 
actually harm another person).    
Interpersonal regret and prosocial choice 
 The findings of Experiment 3 indicated that experiencing interpersonal regret about 
failing to act prosocially led to children subsequently making fairer or more prosocial 
choices. This finding demonstrates that the emotion we have measured has a meaningful 
effect on children’s behavior. According to functional theories of regret, although it is 
unpleasant to experience regret, this emotion is an adaptive one in that it supports better 
decision making (Roese, 2005; Zeelenberg, 1999; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007; we note 
though that there is another tradition in psychology that emphasizes the detrimental effects of 
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harboring regrets on well-being, particularly in old age, e.g., Brassen, Gamer, Peters, Gluth, 
& Büchel, 2012; Wrosch, Bauer, & Sheier, 2005). Most of the research that has examined the 
links between regret and decision making has focused on intrapersonal regret (e.g., Connolly 
& Zeelenberg, 2002; Coricelli et al., 2005; Zeelenberg, 1999). On the basis of such findings, 
Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007) argue that regret affects decision making in two ways: as a 
result of experiencing the emotion of regret itself and as a result of anticipating future regret. 
They argue that the function of experienced regret following a non-optimal choice is to 
enable people to switch choices when faced with a similar decision again. Anticipation of 
regret affects decision making because people are regret averse and will try to make choices 
that will minimize future regret, even if they have never encountered that type of choice 
before. There is strong evidence from studies with adults, reviewed by Zeelenberg and 
Pieters, that intrapersonal regret affects self-interested decision making in both these ways. 
What is less clear is whether interpersonal regret has similar effects on choices that involve 
another person.  
Some studies have examined the role of regret in tasks in which interpersonal choices 
are made, most notably the ultimatum game (Martinez, Zeelenberg, & Rijsman, 2011, van der 
Schalk, Bruder, & Manstead, 2012; van der Schalk et al., 2015; Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997). 
There is some evidence that players in this game will be more likely to make fairer offers if 
they anticipate feeling interpersonal regret about making an unfair offer (van der Schalk et 
al., 2012; van der Schalk et al., 2015), although there is also evidence that players anticipate 
intrapersonal regret over making unduly high offers and that this leads to lower offers 
(Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997). Taken together, this set of findings with adults suggests that 
anticipating interpersonal regret can lead to more prosocial decisions, but that this may be 
weighed against anticipated intrapersonal regret about being unnecessarily generous.  
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Our findings in Experiment 3 indicate that experiencing interpersonal regret in one 
task results in children being more likely to make a generous or fair choice in a different task. 
This finding is consistent with functional theories of regret, and also suggests that the 
developmental emergence of interpersonal regret may have an impact on children’s prosocial 
decision making. However, although we can be confident that interpersonal regret in the 
Sticker task resulted in children subsequently being more likely to make fairer or prosocial 
choices, the mechanism underpinning this effect needs to be addressed in future research. In 
particular, it is not clear whether it is the experience of regret itself that directly affected 
subsequent behavior, or whether experiencing regret facilitated the anticipation of future 
regret which is turn affected children’s choices in the economic game. This issue is important 
in the context of the wider debate over how emotions impact on decision making (e.g., 
Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007; Winkielman, Knutson, Paulus, & Trujillo, 2007).  
Summary and conclusions 
Our studies suggest that children can experience interpersonal regret following a 
failure to act prosocially from the age of 6- to 7 years, an age which is consistent with the 
majority of findings in the developmental literature on intrapersonal regret. Experiencing this 
emotion has an effect on children’s behavior: children who felt regret were more likely to 
subsequently make prosocial choices in a separate task. We did not find evidence of 
interpersonal regret in children younger than 6-7 years. Although this study provides novel 
developmental findings regarding interpersonal regret, it also highlights the need for future 
research that would establish the nature of the relevant developmental changes and shed more 
light on exactly how regret could have an impact on children’s behavioral choices and, more 
broadly, on their moral and social development. 
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Table 1.  
The percentage of children who felt sadder in Experiments 1 and 2 as a function of age group 
and condition 
  Condition 
  Experimental Control Unintentional 
Exp. 1 6- to 7-year-olds (N = 88) 
7- to 9-year-olds (N = 92) 
59.3% 
66.7% 
29.1% 
25% 
27.6% 
29% 
Exp. 2 5- to 6-year-olds (N = 84) 27.6% 25% 33.3% 
 7- to 9-year-olds (N = 96) 74.2% 21.9% 24.2% 
 
Table 2.  
Results of the Binary Logistic Regression Analyses for Experiments 1 and 2.  
   95% Confidence Intervals for Exp b 
 B(SE) Exp b Lower Upper 
Experiment 1     
Gender -0.15 (0.34) 0.861 0.45 1.66 
Age Group 0.26 (0.34) 1.297 0.67 2.51 
Unintentional -1.50** (0.40) 0.223 0.10 0.49 
Control -1.69** (0.41) 0.185 0.08 0.41 
Initial Emotion Rating 0.27 (0.16) 1.307 0.96 1.77 
Constant -1.240 (0.83) 0.289   
     
Experiment 2     
Gender -0.61 (0.35) 0.55 0.28 1.08 
Age Group -0.46 (0.34) 0.63 0.32 1.24 
Unintentional -2.82* (1.32) 0.06 0.01 0.79 
Control -2.13 (1.36) 0.13 0.01 1.71 
Age Group*Condition 
Unintentional 
2.54** (0.83) 12.65 2.47 64.65 
Age Group *Condition 
Control 
2.28** (0.86) 9.75 1.82 52.26 
Initial Emotion Rating 0.002 (0.16) 1.00 0.74 1.37 
Constant 2.29 (0.85) 9.89   
 
Note. *p < .05; **p < .001. The Experimental condition is the reference category. For 
Experiment 1, R2 = .14 (Cox & Snell), R2 = .19 (Nagelkerke); Model χ2 = 27.77; df = 5; p < 
.001. For Experiment 2, R2 = .15 (Cox & Snell), R2 = .21 (Nagelkerke); Model χ2 = 29.29; df 
= 7; p < .001. 
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Figure 1. Percentage of children feeling happier, sadder, or the same in Experiment 1, as a 
function of age group and condition.  
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Figure 2. Percentage of children feeling happier, sadder, or the same in Experiment 2, as a 
function of age group and condition. 
 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
5-6 yrs 7-9 yrs 5-6 yrs 7-9 yrs 5-6 yrs 7-9 yrs
Experimental Control Unintentional
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
ch
ild
re
n
Happier
Sadder
Same
p < .001 
p < .001 
47 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of children making the most prosocial choice in each trial type in 
Experiment 3 as a function of task order and whether children experienced regret in the 
Sticker task.  
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